Lying in order to manipulate the Gale-Shapley matching algorithm has been studied in [2] and [3] and was shown to be generally more appealing to the proposed-to side (denoted as the women in [1]) than to the proposing side (denoted as men there). It can also be shown that in the case of lying women, for every woman who is better-off due to lying, there exists a man who is worse-off.
Background

The Gale-Shapley Algorithm
In order to standardize the notation used throughout this article, and for sake of self-containment, let us quickly recap the scenario introduced in [1] and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm introduced there: is run according to the "true" preferences of all women and all other men) and that no subset of the men can all get better matches by lying in a coordinated fashion.
These observations lead to the analysis of the profitability of lying by women in [3] , where it is proven that if more that one stable matching exists, then at least one woman can get a better match by lying about her preferences.
It is easy to show that any woman who is better off as a result of someone's lie (whoever that liar or those liars may be and whatever their lie may be) is matched (due to the lie) to someone who is now worse off. (Indeed, if they are both better off, then the original match can not be stable.) In other words, for every woman who is better-off, some man is worse-off.
As mentioned above, in the next section we will show that an even stronger dichotomy between the goals of the sexes holds, while a form of sisterhood between the lying and the "innocent" women also holds.
Monogamous Matchings
The Theorem
Let W and M be equally-sized finite sets of women and men, respectively. Let each member of these sets be endowed with a strict order of preference regarding the members of the other set. These will be referred to as "the true preferences", the application of the Gale-Shapley algorithm according to these preferences will be referred to as OA (original algorithm), and resulting matching will be referred to as "the original matching".
Assume that a subset of the women, denoted L (for liars) declare false orders of preference for themselves. Call the application of the Gale-Shapley algorithm according to these false preferences for the members of L, and according to the real preferences of other members of W (referred to, henceforth, as innocent) and of all the members of M, NA , and the resulting matching -"the new matching".
Definition 2.1. A person p ∈ W ∪M is said to be "better-off" (resp. "worse-off") if p prefers, according to their true order of preference, their match according to the new matching (resp. the original matching) over their match according to the original matching (resp. the new matching).
Let us now phrase our main result for the above conditions.
Theorem 2.2. Under the above conditions, if no lying woman is worse-off, then: (a) No woman is worse-off. (b) No man is better-off.
Proofs for a Special Case Definition 2.3. A woman l ∈ L is said to be lying in a personally-optimal way if, all other orders of preference being the same, there is no other false order of preference she can declare which will result in her being even better-off, i.e. her being matched with a man she (truly) prefers over the man matched to her by the new matching.
Theorem 2.2 is easily provable in the special case that all women in L lie in a personally-optimal way, as it is possible to show that in this case, the new matching is stable under the true preferences, and thus, no woman is worse-off, and no man is better-off, than under the original matching. Nonetheless, it will be shown below that in some cases, when liars may coordinate their lies, it is logical to lie in a non-personally-optimal way, and that in these cases the resulting matching might be unstable under the true preferences.
It can be noted that if we examine a "lying game" between the member of L, where a player's strategy is a declaration of a specific order of preference for theirself, and the utility for each player is determined by the position of her new match on their true preference list, then in this game, the conditions of the special case described above are met if and only if the set of lies constitutes a Nash equilibrium.
Roth (private communication, Dec. 2007) suggested the following sketch of a proof to part a of Theorem 2.2:
• If women can do better than to state their true preferences, they can do so by truncating their preferences.
• Truncating preferences is the opposite of extending preferences (as discussed in [6] in the context of adding new players)
• When any woman extends her preferences, it harms the other women.
(As already noted, truncating preference lists is discussed in section 3 below.) While this also proves Theorem 2.2 in the special case discussed above (in which all women lie in a personally-optimal way), it appears not to prove Theorem 2.2 itself (i.e., with no additional assumptions), as while it is true that if a woman can do better than to state her true preferences then she can do better by truncating them (and even more so, there always exists a truncation of her true preferences which constitutes a personallyoptimal lie for her), it turns out that there may exist some man whom she can secure for herself by submitting false preferences, but not by truncating her true preferences. This will be illustrated by an example below.
When a Lie Needs Not be Optimal
As was shown in section 2.2, Theorem 2.2 is easily provable if each lying woman lies in a personally-optimal way, or if the new matching is stable under everyone's true preferences.
Before continuing to the main proof, let us give an example of a scenario with the following properties:
1. No woman can do better by lying alone (while all others tell the truth).
2. In every conspiracy by more than one woman to lie so that none of them are worse-off and at least one is better-off, there exists a woman who does not lie in a personally-optimal way. In other words, it is logical to lie in a non-optimal way.
3. The resulting matching is not stable under the true preferences and can not be achieved by simply truncating women's true preference lists (even if that is allowed).
This example includes four women (w 1 , ..., w 4 ) and four men (m 1 , ..., m 4 ). The orders of preference for the women fulfill:
• w 1 : First choice: m 3 , second choice: m 1 .
• w 2 : First choice: m 3 , second choice: m 1 .
• w 3 : Prefers m 2 over m 1 and prefers m 1 over m 3 .
• w 4 : Any order of preference. 
It is clear from this examination that any conspiring subset of the women wishing to make a difference (in the scenario which does not allow truncating preference lists) has to include w 1 . Also, it can be verified that w 1 can not lie alone (while all others tell the truth) and become better-off. Indeed, in order to become better-off, w 1 has to be matched, under the new matching, with m 3 , and since he prefers w 2 over her, this entails his rejection by w 2 , but since he is the first choice of w 2 , this means w 2 has to lie and declare that she prefers another man over him. Let us assume, then, that L = {w 1 , w 2 }. (It can be verified that the result would not change even if we admit more women to L.)
It can easily be verified that, given the true orders of preference for everyone except w 1 and w 2 , there exists exactly one combination of false orders of preference for these two women (up to changes in their preferences regarding men who will not reach their windows as long as everyone else tells the truth) which will cause them both to be better-off:
• w 1 must declare she prefers m 3 over m 4 and m 4 over m 1 .
• w 2 must declare she prefers m 1 over m 3 and m 3 over m 2 .
Let us examine NA under these false orders of preference:
Indeed, w 1 and w 2 are both better-off (and, as Theorem 2.2 states, no other woman is worse-off, and the even innocent w 3 is better-off as well) however this lie is clearly not personally-optimal for w 2 , since she can declare any order of preference under which her first choice is m 3 , and become even better-off by being matched with him, but if she tries to do that (either by telling the truth, or by lying), then w 1 becomes worse-off and in this case it is better for w 1 to tell the truth which, as stated earlier, will cause the new matching to be identical to the old matching, and hence will cause w 2 to be matched with m 2 , ending up in a worse situation than had she lied the above-described non-personally-optimal lie.
In the above-described lying game between w 1 and w 2 , the utility for each of the players given these strategies is higher than her utility in any Nash equilibrium, and this is the only pair of strategies (up to the degrees of freedom discussed above) with this property.
It should be noted that the resulting new matching is neither stable under the original preferences (as w 2 and m 3 truly prefer each other over their respective matches) nor can it be achieved by simply truncating the preference lists of w 1 and w 2 (as any such truncation will result in w 2 either having a blank list or a list with m 3 as her first choice), giving, as promised, an example where the above proofs do not hold.
A General Proof
Before proving the general case of Theorem 2.2, let us first introduce a few notations: For each person p ∈ W ∪ M, let us denote the person from the opposite sex matched with p under the original matching (resp. new matching) with O(p) (resp. N(p)).
Definition 2.4.
A woman w ∈ W is said to be a rejecter if she rejected N(w) during OA . In this case, let the man who serenaded under her window on the night of OA on which she rejected N(w), but whom she did not reject on that night (and whom, therefore, she prefers over N(w)), be denoted B(w).
Lemma 2.5. If a man m ∈ M never serenaded under the window of a woman
Proof. Since m approaches women according to his own order of preference, and since he never reached w's window during NA (resp. OA ), then he must have ended up being matched, under the new (resp. old) matching, to a woman he prefers over w, and by definition, that woman is N(m) (resp. O(m)).
By the following Lemma, we need only prove part b of Theorem 2.2.
Lemma 2.6. If a woman w ∈ W is worse-off, then O(w) is better-off.
Proof. Since w is worse-off, w prefers O(w) over N(w) according to her true order of preference. Since it is given that no liar is worse-off, then w is not a liar, and therefore she declared that she prefers O(w) over N(w) also during NA . Therefore, since w prefers N(w) over any other man who serenaded under her window during NA , it follows that O(w) could not have serenaded under her window on any night during NA . Thus, by Lemma 2.5, Proof. By induction and transitivity, w prefers O(w) over any man she rejected during OA and therefore, being a rejecter, over N(w), and is thus worse-off. Lemma 2.9. If a woman w ∈ W is a rejecter, then B(w) prefers N(B(w)) over w.
Proof. By Lemma 2.8, w is not a liar, and as such, her order of preference during NA is her true order of preference. Since w is a rejecter, w prefers B(w) over N(w). Therefore, as w truly prefers N(w) over any other man who serenaded under her window during NA , it follows that B(w) could not have serenaded under w's window during NA . Thus, by Lemma 2.5, B(w) prefers N(B(w)) over w. Proof. Throughout this proof, for the sake of conciseness, wherever we discuss whether a rejection or serenading occurred, or when it occurred, we always refer to OA . Since w is a rejecter, then according to Lemma 2.9, B(w) prefers N(B(w)) over w. Also note that by definition of B(w), B(w) serenaded under w's window on some night. By these two observations, and since B(w) approaches women according to his own order of preference, N(B(w)) rejected B(w), and did so on a night strictly earlier than any night on which B(w) serenaded under w's window. Since N(B(w)) rejected B(w) = N(N(B(w))), then she is a rejecter. Moreover, since, by definition of B(w), w rejected N(w) on a night on which B(w) serenaded under her window as well, then this night is a strictly later night than the night on which N(B(w)) rejected B(w).
To complete the proof of Theorem 2.2, assume for contradiction that there exists a better-off man m ∈ M. Let us denote w 1 = N(m), and by Lemma 2.7, she is a rejecter. Now, for each i ∈ N, assume by induction that w i is a rejecter and set w i+1 = N(B(w i )). By Lemma 2.10, w i+1 is a rejecter. Moreover, by that lemma, during OA , w i rejected N(w i ) on a night strictly later than the night on which w i+1 rejected B(w i ) = N(N(B(w i ))) = N(w i+1 ).
From finiteness of W , there must exist i < j such that w i = w j , but by induction, since i < j, then during OA , w i rejected N(w i ) on a night strictly later than the night on which w j rejected N(w j ) -a contradiction. 
Generalizations
Polygamous Matchings
In [1] , a one-to-many version of the algorithm was specified and proposed as a way to assign students to colleges (on each algorithm-step, the students apply to their favorite not-yet-rejected-by college, and then each college rejects all applicants except for the most preferred ones, according to the quota of this college) and proved that the resulting matching is stable and that it is optimal (within all stable matches) for each applicant. It can also be shown that it is the worst (within all stable matches) for each college.
In [4] , it was made public that the assignment of medical interns to hospitals in the USA has been done using a similar algorithm since 1951, however, in this algorithm the roles were switched and the hospitals were the 'proposers' and the resulting matching is optimal (within all stable matches) for each hospital and worst for each intern.
In this subsection, we will prove a generalization of Theorem 2.2 for these scenarios. In order to ease the transition from the previous section, we will maintain the notation of women and men, and refer to the above scenarios as "the polygamous scenarios". Let us redefine our notation for these scenarios:
Let W and M be finite lists of women and men, respectively, and let each person be endowed, as before, with a strict order of preference with regards to the members of the opposite sex. For each person p ∈ W ∪ M, define n p to be the "quota" of this person, i.e., the amount of spouses from the opposite sex this person seeks. As our goal is the generalization of both algorithms described above, the reader may assume, for ease of readability, that either all women are monogamous (∀w ∈ W : n w = 1) or all men are monogamous (∀m ∈ M : n m = 1), however the rest of this paper holds verbatim even if this is not the case. (If both the women and men are monogamous we are reduced to the scenario given in the previous section.) We will also assume for now that w∈W n w = m∈M n m . (This guarantees that when the algorithm stops, each person p is matched with exactly n p people of the opposite sex -this reduces in the monogamous case to W and M being of identical size.) Definition 3.1. A map between W and M, mapping each p ∈ W ∪ M to exactly n p members of the set p does not belong to, is called a matching.
The definition of instability of a matching requires another detail which was inferred from the other requirements in the monogamous scenario: 
w prefersm over m.
3.m prefers w overw.
As before, a matching which is not unstable is called stable.
On each night of the polygamous algorithm, each man m ∈ M serenades under the windows of n m women that he prefers the most out of all women who have not (yet) rejected him, and then each woman w ∈ W , under whose window more than n w men serenade, rejects every man who serenaded under her window, except for the n w men she prefers most among them. Now, as before, assume that a subset of the women, denoted L, declare false orders of preference for themselves.
For a person p ∈ P , Let us denote the set of people of the opposite sex matched with this person under the original matching (resp. the new matching) with O(p) = {o
Before we phrase the polygamous version of Theorem 2.2, we have to redefine the circumstances under which a person is said to be better-, or worse-off. It should be noted that while in the monogamous scenario each person's order of preference yields a full order on the set of possible matches for that person (i.e., people of the opposite sex), in the polygamous case each person's order of preference yields a partial order on the set of possible matches for that person (i.e., n p -tuples of people of the opposite sex). This introduces an asymmetry between the following two definitions, which did not exist in the monogamous scenario. The special case of Theorem 3.5 in which all women are polygamous and men are monogamous can be easily proven by reduction to the conditions of Theorem 2.2 by "replicating" each polygamous woman w ∈ W into n w monogamous women {(w, i)} nw i=1 , each having the same order of preference as w. For each man m ∈ M, replace w on his list of preferences with these women, in such a way that he prefers (w, i) over (w, i + 1) for all i. A reduction along these lines was used in [2] to generalize certain properties of the monogamous scenario to the polygamous-women scenario and it was shown there that the men matched with (w, 1), ..., (w, n w ) by the monogamous algorithm are exactly those matched with w by the polygamous algorithm. Furthermore, in the notations of this paper, it can be shown that the man matched with (w, i) by OA is o w i and by NA is n w i , thus completing the reduction since this yields that w is weakly better-off if and only if none of the monogamous women (w, i) is worse-off, and since it is clear that as all men are monogamous, if a man is not better-off under the reduction, then he has only gained worse matches before the reduction.
Unfortunately, "replicating" each man in a similar same way will not yield a proof for even the monogamous women -polygamous men scenario as easily, for it is possible for a woman w to be weakly better-off before the reduction by maintaining the same match m, but to be worse-off under the reduction because her match is e.g. (m, 2) instead of (m, 1). Also, every replicated monogamous man not being better-off under the reduction does not necessarily imply that every polygamous man has gained only worse matches before the reduction. To make things even worse, in the general case where both men and women may be polygamous, running the monogamous algorithm after such a "replication" does not even produce the same matching as would be produced by the polygamous algorithm, as it may lead to situations such as a couple matched to each other with multiplicity greater than 1.
Indeed, in order to prove Theorem 3.5 in its general form we have to retrace our steps and revisit the inner workings of the proof of Theorem 2.2, rewriting it to accommodate for the generalizations we introduced. We will now redefine some of the definitions used in that proof, and then give its generalized form. 
Definition 3.7. A man m ∈ M is said to be a rejectee if there exists a rejecter w ∈ N(m) such that m ∈ R(w). Similarly to the proof of Theorem 2.2, a key role will be played by a man B(w, m) for which, in a sense, m was rejected. The exact definition of this man will appear in Lemma 3.11.
As before, we will begin with a Lemma by which we need only prove part b of Theorem 3.5.
Lemma 3.8. If a woman w ∈ W is not weakly better-off, then there exists m ∈ O(w) who has not gained only worse matches.
Proof. Since it is given that all liars are weakly better-off, if follows that w is not a liar, and therefore her order of preference during NA is her true order of preference. Since w is not weakly better-off, there exists 1 ≤ i ≤ n w such that w prefers o Proof. Since m has not gained only worse matches, there there exist w ∈ O(m) andw ∈ N(m) \ O(m) such that m prefersw over w. Since w ∈ O(m), it follows that m serenaded under w's window during OA . Since m approaches women according to his own order of preference, he would not have serenaded under w's window during OA without having serenaded on the same night, or on a previous night, underw's window. However, since m is not matched withw at the end of OA , thenw must have rejected him during OA and therefore, by definition, m ∈ R(w), and thus m is a rejectee.
Lemma 3.10. If a woman w ∈ W is a rejecter, then she is not weakly better-off.
Proof. Since w is a rejecter, there exists r ∈ R(w) and by the definition of R(w) there exists 1 ≤ i ≤ n w such that n w i = r. Since, by definition of R(w), w rejected r during OA , and since, by induction and transitivity, w prefers each member of O(w) over any man she rejected during OA , it follows that she prefers o w i over r = n w i , and is, thus, not weakly better-off. Lemma 3.11. If a woman w ∈ W is a rejecter, then for each r ∈ R(w) there exists a man B(w, r) such that 1. B(w, r) serenaded under w's window during OA on the night on which she rejected r, but B(w, r) was not rejected by her on that night. N(B(w, r) ) over w.
B(w, r) prefers each member of
(If more than one such man exists, define B(w, r) to be one of these men, arbitrarily.)
Proof. By Lemma 3.10, w is not a liar, and as such, her order of preference during NA is her true order of preference. Let B be the set of all men who serenaded under her window on the night during OA on which she rejected r, but who were not rejected by her on that night. By definition of the algorithm, w prefers each member of B over r, and |B| = n w . Since w did not reject r during NA (since r ∈ N(w)), and since the order of preference of w during NA is her true order of preference, then not all member of B serenaded under her window during NA (for she is matched under NA to the set of the n w men that she prefers most out of all the men who serenaded under her window during NA ). Define, therefore, B(w, r) to be a member of B who did not serenade under w's window during NA . Since B(w, r) did not serenade under w's window during NA , and since he approaches women according to his own order of preference, it follows that he prefers each member of N(B(w, r)) over w.
Lemma 3.12. If a woman w ∈ W is a rejecter, then for each r ∈ R(w) there exists a womanw ∈ N(B(w, r)) such that 1.w is a rejecter.
B(w, r) ∈ R(w)
3. During OA , w rejected r on a strictly later night than the night on which w rejected B(w, r).
Proof. Once again, throughout this proof, for the sake of conciseness, wherever we discuss whether a rejection or serenading occurred, or when it occurred, we always refer to OA . Since w is a rejecter, then by Lemma 3.11, B(w, r) serenaded under w's window (on the night on which she rejected r) and B(w, r) prefers each member of N(B(w, r)) over w. Hence, as B(w, r) approaches n B(w,r) women each night according to his own order of preference, and as |N(B(w, r))| = n B(w,r) , it follows that B(w, r) serenaded on earlier nights under each of the windows of N(B(w, r)) and was rejected by at least one of them on a night strictly earlier than any night on which he serenaded under w's window -let us denote such a womanw. Sincew rejected B(w, r) (to whom she is matched under the new matching), it follows that she is a rejecter and that B(w, r) ∈ R(w). Moreover, since, by definition of B(w, r), w rejected r on a night on which B(w, r) serenaded under her window as well, then this night is a strictly later night than the night on whichw rejected B(w, r).
To complete the proof of Theorem 3.5, assume for contradiction that there exists a man m 1 ∈ M who has not gained only worse matches. By Lemma 3.9, m 1 is a rejectee, therefore there exists a rejecter w 1 ∈ N(m 1 ) such that m 1 ∈ R(w 1 ). Now, for each i ∈ N, assume by induction that w i is a rejectee and that m i ∈ R(w i ) and set, by Lemma 3.11, m i+1 = B(w i , m i ). By Lemma 3.12 , there exists a rejecter w i+1 ∈ N(m i+1 ). Moreover, by that lemma, during OA , w i rejected m i on a night strictly later than the night on which w i+1 rejected m i+1 .
From finiteness of W × M, there must exist i < j such that w i = w j and m i = m j , but by induction, since i < j, then during OA , w i rejected m i on a night strictly later than the night on which w j rejected m j -a contradiction.
Blacklists and Mismatched Quotas
As mentioned before, in [1] , it is not required that the sum of the quotas of all colleges be the same as the number of applicants, resulting is some colleges not fulfilling their quotas or some applicants not being accepted to any college. Moreover, it is allowed for a college to remove some of the students from its preference list, indicating that the college is unwilling to accept these candidates even if it means that its quota will not be met. Similarly, it is allowed for an applicant to remove some of the colleges from their preference lists, indicating their unwillingness to attend these colleges even at the risk of not being accepted to any college.
The modified algorithm-step for this scenario (in the notations used throughout this document) is that if, by a certain night, the number of women who have not blacklisted or (yet) rejected a man m ∈ M, and are not blacklisted by him, is less than n m , then on that night he will serenade under the windows of all these women. (Otherwise, if there are at least n m such women, he will, as before, serenade under the windows of the n m women that he prefers most out of them.)
Let us adjust our notations for this scenario, and then prove that the result of this paper still holds under it: Definition 3.13. A map between W and M, mapping each p ∈ W ∪ M to at most n p members of the set p does not belong to, is called a matching. 1. p is matched with less than n p spouses.
p has not blacklisted m (resp. w).
3. m (resp. w) prefers p over w (resp. m).
Once again, a matching which is not unstable is called stable. old (resp. new) matching before the reduction is identical to the old (resp. new) matching under the reduction, after the newly-introduced people have been removed from it, that each of the original women is weakly better-off before the reduction iff she is weakly better-off under the reduction, and that if each of the original men has gained only worse matches under the reduction, then he has also gained only worse matches before the reduction. which yields that all members of this inequality are actually equal. Since for every woman w ∈ W , |N(w)| ≥ |O(w)|, (res. for every man m ∈ M, |N(m)| ≤ |O(m)|,) and since summing over all women (resp. all men) we get an equality, it follows that the equality holds for each woman (resp. each man) separately.
It should be noted that in [5] , Corollary 3.17 is proved using an entirely different approach for the special case of the monogamous scenario where the new match is stable, and in [6] , it is proved also for the polygamous scenario where the new match is stable. Corollary 3.17 generalizes these results, as it does not require stability of the new match. Proof. Since the liar is better-off, then she is newly matched with some man to whom she was not originally matched, and since the number of matches for this man remained the same, then he is no longer matched with some woman to whom he was originally matched, and hence the set of matches for that woman has changed, and thus, since she is weakly better-off, she is better-off.
Summary and Open Problems
We have shown throughout this paper that even in very general scenarios, a form of sisterhood exists in the Gale-Shapley matching algorithm, both in terms of not harming each other, and in terms of not helping any man.
If one were to define the concepts of "weakly worse-off" and "having gained only better matches" along the lines of definitions 3.3 and 3.4, then one would find that gaining only worse matches is stronger than (i.e. a special case of) being weakly worse-off and gaining only better matches is stronger case of being better-off. Thus, it follows that in the scenarios discussed in this paper, in a sense, the minimum possible damage to a man is greater than the minimum possible gain for a woman.
It is interesting to check whether, under various conditions, the overall damage to men is, in any sense, usually greater that the overall gain for women (and thus resulting in damage to the entire population as a whole, which contrasts the sisterhood which exists amongst the women).
The example given in this paper (and other examples given in the first author's undergraduate thesis, upon which this paper is based) had to be crafted very delicately. It is interesting to check whether, when the orders of preference are determined by a random model, lies can be very beneficial (either for the lying women, and for their innocent colleagues), or whether the utility gained from such a lie is usually relatively small. Furthermore, in many of these examples, and in many examples specified in the literature, the preferences of every person differ greatly from those of each of their colleagues. In the real-world scenario of colleges and applicants, however, it is reasonable to expect the preferences of most applicants to be similar, and the same applies to the preferences of most colleges. There will always be differences, but it seems that they are likely to be local, such as a permutation on colleges which follow each other in the order of preference. It seems unlikely, for example, for a certain col-lege to be highly rated by half of the applicants and poorly raged by the rest. (All this applies to the preferences of colleges as well, naturally.) It is interesting to try and build a probabilistic model along these lines, that matches the observed behaviors by medical interns and colleges throughout the years, and to check the questions raised above under such a model. In addition, since in the real world the knowledge of each player is not full, it can be interesting to check whether, given only knowledge of a statistical model for the preferences of the rest of the players (and possibly full knowledge of the preferences of just a few players), there exist strategies (for individual players, or for small sets of players) which are expected to be better for these players than telling the truth. It can also be interesting to check what happens if such strategies are simultaneously applied by more than one conspiring set of players.
